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ABSTRACT 
 
Current study tests the impact of audit committees to the real earnings management.Using 
the manufacturing public listed companies from Indoensia Stock Exchange from 2012 until 
2014, we found that that financial and accounting expertise of audit committee members and 
audit committee size have positive effect on real earnings management. Furthermore, we 
also found that the dual positions of the audit committee chairman have a negative effect on 
earnings management. The Tenure of audit committee chairman however, has no impact on 
real earnings management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) has 
required all listed companies to implement 
good corporate governance. This is because 
the good corporate governance is a tool to 
connect the company management with 
board of directors and stakeholders. Based 
on this, Indonesia Stock Exchange issued a 
regulation No: Kep-315 / BEJ / 06 / -2000 
enhanced with regulations No .: Kep-339 / 
BEJ / 07 / -2001 on July 1, 2001 related to 
the establishment of an audit committee, 
independent commissioner and board 
secretary of listed companies. Indonesia 
Stock Exchange reconfirmed the rules with 
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the issuance of Bapepam Chairman Decree 
No .: Kep-29 / PM / 2004, in which the 
contents of the decision requires companies 
listed on the Stock Exchange to have an 
audit committee. The regulations require a 
minimum of three independent people who 
make up the audit committee. One of the 
three members is from an independent 
commissioner who will be the chairman of 
the audit committee. In addition, one of the 
three members must have expertise and 
capabilities in the field of accounting and 
finance. 
With three members, the board formed 
an audit committee in order to assist the 
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commissioners in their duties. The audit 
committee has a role in helping 
commissioners in overseeing the 
management doing the financial reporting 
process. The role makes the audit committee 
is often linked to the quality of financial 
reporting. The existence of the audit 
committee should be able to improve the 
quality of financial reporting and company's 
internal control quality that aims to provide 
protection to shareholders. 
Nevertheless, within the last ten 
years many scandals appeared related to 
financial reporting. That makes the 
effectiveness of audit committees in 
overseeing the financial reporting process in 
the company was often questioned (Vafeas 
in Putri, 2011). The collapse of several large 
companies that never happened raises 
questions related to supervision by the board 
of directors and the audit committee due to 
the manipulation of doing accounting 
records. Those manipulation activities are 
known as earnings management (earnings 
management).  
According to Schipper (1989), 
earnings management is interference in the 
determination of earnings that is done 
deliberately for personal gain. Earnings 
management can occur for several reasons, 
such as to increase the manager 
compensation, boost stock prices, and get 
subsidies from the government 
(Subramanyam and Wild, 2013). 
Earnings management can be 
categorized into the accrual earnings 
management and real earnings management, 
based on whether or not to have a direct 
impact on cash flow. Accrual management 
earnings are earnings manipulation using 
methods and accounting estimates that are 
not a direct impact on cash flow. Instead, the 
real earnings management is earnings 
manipulation using operational activities 
that directly affect to the cash flow. Real 
earnings management is known in the post 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) period. 
Compared by accrual earnings management, 
real earnings management has received little 
attention in the research literature. 
Therefore, this study focuses on real 
earnings management. 
Roychowdhury (2006) 
comprehensively investigate earnings 
management through real activities. 
According to Roychowdhury (2006) 
earnings management through real activities 
is activity originating from normal 
operational practices, which encouraged 
manager desire to mislead some 
stakeholders as a general statement users 
into believing that certain financial reporting 
purposes has been fulfilled in a credible form 
of operational operation. Research results 
show that managers typically take three 
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types of activity manipulation of real 
activity, namely (1) manipulation of the sale, 
(2) a reduction in discretionary costs 
(general and administrative expenses and 
cost of sales), and (3) excessive production 
(overproducing). Earnings management 
actions undertaken by management is the 
accounting reality that is difficult to accept 
by the user, can damage the credibility of 
financial reporting (Subramanyam and 
Wild, 2013). 
The responsibility of the board of 
commissioners is to act as representatives of 
the shareholders in all respects, so the 
commissioners must supervise the manager 
to restrict the activity of the real 
manipulation. Although the audit committee 
plays a major role in the regulatory process 
of financial reporting, it is unclear whether 
the audit committee can effectively inhibit 
the activity of real earnings management. 
Research related to the effectiveness 
of the audit committee have been done, but 
until now there are still few empirical 
evidences that founded about how the 
characteristics of the audit committee impact 
real earnings management. Visvanathan 
(2008) used data pre-SOX to examine the 
relationship between real earnings 
management and three characteristics of 
audit committee, specifically the 
independence of the audit committee, the 
audit committee size, and frequency of audit 
committee meetings. The results showed 
that the frequency of audit committee 
meetings negatively affect the real income 
related management discretionary cost 
reductions, but not for the manipulation of 
sales activity and activity overproducting. 
Mughni (2014) had a research related to the 
influence of the characteristics of the audit 
committee and audit quality on earnings 
management. The characteristics of the audit 
committee is used, which is a measure of the 
audit committee, financial expertise of audit 
committee members, the number of audit 
committee meetings. The results showed 
that only financial expertise that have a 
significant effect on earnings management. 
  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Agency theory is a theory that 
describes the relationship between the agent 
and the principal. On the one hand manager 
have a role to be agent and on the other as 
the principal (owner of the company) 
(Hendriksen and Breda, 1992). 
Agency theory occurs because of a 
conflict of interest between the principal 
(owner) and agent (management). In the 
agency theory all individuals are assumed to 
do things just based on their self-serving. 
The owners (principals) are assumed to be 
mainly interested in the acquisition of the 
yield on the investment that the owners do 
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on a company. While management (agent) is 
assumed to receive compensation that is 
derived from a monthly compensation and 
also compensation gained from involvement 
in an agency relationship (Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 2011). 
This conflict of interest raises the 
existence of information asymmetry. 
Asymmetry of information is an imbalance 
gained between information of manager as a 
provider of information to the shareholders 
and stakeholders in general as consumers of 
information. There are two kinds of 
information asymmetry, namely: 
Adverse selection, which is 
compared with the shareholders, the 
management is know more information 
about the situation and prospects of 
company.That condition can cause the 
information given to the principal does not 
fully rendered by the agent. 
Moral hazard, which is shareholders 
doesn’t know all the activities doing by the 
management, so that management can take 
action beyond the knowledge of 
shareholders. Such actions constitute a 
breach of contract and not ethically. 
Implementations of basic earnings 
management can be explained by the theory 
agency. Earnings management occurs 
because of a conflict of interest between the 
principal andagents. Management has more 
information than shareholder so that it can 
trigger asymmetric information.Asymmetry 
information involve management to have 
motivation and strong chance to practice 
earning management. User of financial 
report difficult to accept earning 
management practice by management. 
Earning management can decrease 
credibility of financial reporting. 
Schipper (1989) contend that earning 
management is management’s interference 
for determining of company’s profit to gain 
individual motive. There are several reasons 
from management doing earnings 
management, among which is to raise stock 
prices by increase profits, increasing 
manager compensation, and to get subsidies 
from the government. 
Roychowdhury (2006) 
comprehensively investigate earnings 
management through real activities. His 
research states that the management usually 
doing three types of activity manipulation of 
real activity, namely: 
Sales Manipulation 
Manipulation is defined as the sales 
manager effort to increase sales during the 
years for the purpose of achieving profit 
targets. Management generates additional 
sales by offering a limited discount price and 
by offering soft credit terms. As a result, 
sales volume increased and resulted in 
higher income for the year but the cash flow 
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decreased due to smaller cash inflows due to 
credit sales and discounts offered. 
Reducing Discretionary Expenses 
Management can increase profits by 
reducing discretionary costs. Cost 
discretionary companies consist of cost of 
sales, R & D costs, marketing costs, and 
general and administrative expenses. 
Overproducing 
Manufacturing companies can carry 
out large-scale production (overproducing) 
is to produce the goods in larger quantities 
than is needed in order to achieve the 
expected demand so that profit will increase. 
With this excessive production of fixed 
overhead costs divided by the number of 
units of goods in large quantities would 
bring the cost per unit and the cost of goods 
sold decreased. The decline on cost of goods 
sold will result increasing operating 
margins. 
Company should strive to reduce 
their earning manipulation with doing 
implementation of good corporate 
governance. Good corporate governance 
achievable with formed an audit committee.  
The audit committee is a committee 
formed by the board of directors in order to 
help carry out its duties and functions. 
According Tugiman (1995) the audit 
committee is a group of people elected by a 
larger group to do a particular job or to 
perform specific tasks or the number of 
commissioners of client companies are 
responsible to assist the auditor in 
maintaining their independence from 
management. Their audit committee is 
expected to be able to improve the quality of 
financial reporting produced by 
management and is also expected to be able 
to improve the company's internal control 
aimed at giving protection to shareholders. 
This study examineanything of the 
characteristics of audit committee that can 
reduce the activity of earnings management. 
Characteristics of the audit committee are 
independent variables in this study. 
Characteristics of the audit committee used 
that is expertise financial accounting and 
audit committee members, the size of the 
audit committee, tenure the chairman of the 
audit committee, and the number of 
positions that were held by the chairman of 
the audit committee. The framework in this 
study, namely: 
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Picture 1.1 
Research Framework 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
Financial and AccountingExpertise of 
Audit Committee Member 
The first characteristic of audit 
committee is financial and accounting 
expertise of audit committee members. 
Members with financial and accounting 
expertise can enhance the supervisory 
function owners of the company (the 
principal) on the management (agent) in 
order not to harm the owner of the company. 
Based on the Decree of Chairman of 
Bapepam Number: Kep-29 / PM / 2004 
stating that one of the three members of the 
audit committee must have an educational 
background in accounting or finance. 
Knowledge in the field of accounting and 
finance can be used as the basis for audit 
committee members in their duties. 
Financial and accounting expertise of audit 
committee members are expected to reduce 
a material misstatement in presenting 
financial statements so as to reduce the 
activity of earnings manipulation by 
management. Thus, the greater the audit 
committee members with expertise in 
accounting and finance make the quality of 
financial reporting for the better and secure. 
Previous research showed that the 
accounting and financial expertise of audit 
committee members can facilitate the audit 
committee to be more effective in 
controlling the financial reporting 
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process.Bedard et al., (2004) showed that 
aggressiveness 
earningmanagementnegatively affected 
with accounting and financial expertise of 
audit committee members. Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2008) found that accounting 
conservatism is positively related with 
financial and accounting expertise of audit 
committee members. Based on the above 
explanation, the first hypothesis, that is: 
H1: Financial and accounting 
expertise of audit committee members has 
negative effect on real earnings 
management. 
 
Audit Committee Size 
The second characteristic of audit 
committee is audit committee size. Audit 
committee size help oversee the 
management (agent) that does not harm the 
owner (the principal). The larger of the audit 
committee size oversight of management 
(agents) in the conduct of financial 
reporting becomes more increased. Based 
on the Decree of Chairman of Bapepam 
Number: Kep-29 / PM / 2004 which 
requires the contents of the audit committee 
consisting of at least three independent 
people. 
The amount of audit committees are 
more likely to have members with expertise 
varied to monitor the practices of financial 
reporting done by management (agent) is 
more effective, so that the owner (principal) 
was reporting produced have good quality 
and guaranteed (Baxter and Cotter, 2009). 
Thus, the larger of the audit committee size 
is expected to reduce their earning 
manipulation activities by management. 
Based on the above explanation, the second 
hypothesis, that is: 
H2: Audit committee size 
negatively affect to the real earnings 
management. 
 
Tenure Chairman of Audit Committee 
The third characteristic of audit 
committee istenure chairmanof audit 
committee. Tenure chairmanof audit 
committeewith a long tenure can improve 
owner’s company (principal) supervision 
toward the management (agent). Chairman 
of the audit committee with a long tenure 
has greater the experience and expertise 
oversight of financial reporting, so we can 
easily find misstatements made by 
management. The longer tenure chairman of 
the board can gain relevant knowledge 
related to chairman’s job from time to time 
to improve the performance of their work 
(Fiedler, 1970 in Sun and Lan 2014). 
Beasley (1996) found that manipulation of 
financial statements has possible lower 
value than the company had an average 
longer tenure chairman of the board. 
Therefore, the chairman of audit committee 
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with a long tenure is expected to be more 
effective in overseeing the management 
compared than chairman of the audit 
committee who has shorter tenure, so that 
the resulting financial reporting will be 
more qualified. Based on this explanation, 
the third hypothesis is: 
H3: Tenure chairman of the audit 
committee negatively affect toward the real 
earnings management. 
 
The Number of Positions that were be 
Held by the Chairman of Audit 
Committee 
The fourth characteristic of audit 
committee is the number of positions that 
were is held by the chairman of audit 
committee. The chairman of audit 
committee has double positions outside the 
company can gain experience and greater 
expertise in monitoring managers (Bedard 
et al., 2004). Another that, the chairman of 
audit committee may also have a great 
reputation to motivate his members so that 
it can work better (Shivdasani, 1993 in Sun 
and Lan 2014). 
A large number of positions that 
were be held by the chairman of audit 
committee should be able to reduce earnings 
management activities conducted by the 
management (agent), so that owner’s 
company (the principal) can feel confident 
about the financial reporting because it has 
better quality. Bedard et al., (2004) proved 
earnings management is negatively related 
to the average number of positions that were 
be held by the chairman of audit committee 
outside the company. The results showed 
that the number of positions that were be 
held by the chairman of audit committee 
outside the company more effective to 
detain the earnings management. Based on 
the above explanation, the fourth hypothesis 
is: 
H4: The number of positions that 
were be held by the chairman of audit 
committee negatively affects toward the 
real earnings management. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Population and Sample 
The population in this research is 
manufacturing companies listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in period 2012-
2014. The reason for using a manufacturing 
company as a population is because the 
population in the manufacturing sector is 
more than other sectors. In addition, the data 
contained in the financial statements on 
manufacture companies is more complete 
and complex. The data used are the financial 
statements and annual reports for three 
years from 2012 to 2014. The reason for 
using the data for 2012-2014 is because the 
data year 2012-2014 provide an overview of 
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the current condition of the company which 
is the latest data of the company. 
The sampling technique used in this 
research is purposive sampling, is a 
technique commonly used in the sampling 
process based on certain criteria 
predetermined. The criteria were used: (1) 
Company listed on the Stock Exchange and 
issued financial statements and annual 
reports in a row and complete for the period 
ended December 31, 2012 to 2014; (2) 
manufacturing company issued financial 
statements using the currency of rupiah; and 
(3) the company used as a sample is a 
company with full information relating to 
the calculation indicators and variables used 
in this study. 
Table 1 
Purposive Sampling 
Explanation Amount 
Manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in period 2012-2014 
688 
Companies that do not meet the criteria (544) 
Companies thatmeet the criteria 144 
Outlier  (33) 
Total samples within 3 years 111 
 Source : Secondary data were processed, 2016 
 
Measurement of Real Earnings 
Management 
This study uses real earnings 
management as the dependent variable. 
Real earnings management is earnings 
manipulation by using the operations that 
directly impact on cash flow. Based on 
previous research, measurement of real 
earnings management in this study uses the 
calculation concept of Royhowdhury (2006) 
which uses three approaches, specifically: 
the abnormal production cost caused by 
manipulation of the manufacturing process, 
the abnormal operating cash flow caused by 
manipulation of sales activity, and 
discretionary expenses caused by the 
manipulation of operating expenses. 
The first step is calculating the cost 
of normal production (PROD),discretionary 
expense (DISX), and operating cash flow 
(CFO) following the results of the 
regression for each company. The second 
step is calculating the normal rate on PROD, 
CFO, and DISX separately. 
The concept for the calculation of 
the normal level of production costs 
(PROD), normal levels of operating cash 
flow (CFO), and normal levels of 
discretionary expense (DISX), are: 
Normal Level of Production Costs 
(PROD) 
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〖PROD〗_t/A_(t-1)  □(= α_(0  ) )+ 
β_(1  )  1/A_(t-1)   + β_(2  )  S_t/A_(t-1)   + 
β_(3  )  〖∆S〗_t/A_(t-1)   + β_(4  )  〖∆S
〗_(t-1)/A_(t-1)   + 
which: 
A_(t-1) = total asset inyear t-1 
S_t = Net sales in year t 
〖∆S〗_t = variance of net 
sales from year t-1 to t 
〖PROD〗_t= production cost in 
year t 
α_0 = Constanta 
β_(1-4) = Coefisien 
ε = error 
 
Normal Level of Operating Cash 
Flow (CFO) 
〖CFO〗_t/A_(t-1)  □(= α_(0  ) )+ 
β_(1  )  1/A_(t-1)   + β_(2  )  S_t/A_(t-1)   + 
β_(3  )  〖∆S〗_t/A_(t-1)   + ε_t 
Dimana: 
CFOt = operating cash flow in year t 
 
Normal Level of Discretionary 
Expense (DISX) 
〖DISX〗_t/A_(t-1)  □(= α_(0  ) )+ 
β_(1  )  1/A_(t-1)   + β_(2  )  S_(t-1)/A_(t-
1)   + ε_t 
Which: 
DISXt = discretionary expense in 
yeart (selling expense, general and 
administrative expense) 
The third step is calculating the 
abnormal PROD (APROD), abnormal CFO 
(ACFO), and abnormal DISX (ADISX). 
Abnormal value is calculated by subtracting 
the actual value with the predicted abnormal 
value (Cohen et al., 2008). The concept of 
the calculation is as follows: 
 
Abnormal Level of Cost Production 
 
〖APROD〗_t  =  〖PROD〗
_t/A_(t-1)  □(- ) [β_(1  )  1/A_(t-1)   + β_(2  
)  S_t/A_(t-1)   + β_(3  )  〖∆S〗_t/A_(t-1)   
+ β_(4  )  〖∆S〗_(t-1)/A_(t-1) ] 
Which: 
〖APROD〗_t=Abnormal Level of 
Cost Production in year t 
 
Abnormal Level of Operating Cash 
Flow  
 
〖ACFO〗_t  =  〖CFO〗_t/A_(t-1)  
□( - ) [β_(1  )  1/A_(t-1)   + β_(2  )  S_t/A_(t-
1)   + β_(3  )  〖∆S〗_t/A_(t-1) ] 
Which: 
〖ACFO〗_t    =abnormallevel of 
operating cash flow in year t 
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AbnormalLevel of Discretionary 
Expense 
 
A〖DISX〗_t    =  〖DISX〗_t/A_(t-
1)  □( - ) [β_(1  )  1/A_(t-1)   + β_(2  )  S_(t-
1)/A_(t-1) ] 
 
Which: 
A〖DISX〗_t   =abnormal level of 
discretionary expense in year t 
 
Companies that seek to manipulate 
earnings tend to have higher APROD, while 
ACFO and ADISX lower.The final step is 
combining three sizes of real earnings 
manipulation into a proxy named RM. The 
concept of the calculation is as follows: 
〖RM〗_t    = □(〖APROD〗_t- 〖
ACFO〗_t-〖ADISX〗_t ) 
which: 
〖RM〗_t    = Real earning 
management in year t 
 
Analysis Method 
Hypothesis testing used multiple 
linear regression analysis (multiple 
regression). Multiple linear regression 
analysis aimed to test hypothesis whether 
there is influence between the independent 
variable on the dependent variable. In 
general, multiple linear regression analysis 
model can be written as follows: 
│RMt│=α+β_1 ACEXPt+β_2 
ACSIZEt+β_3 ACTENt+β_4 
ACOTHt+β_5 ROAt+β_6 SIZEt+β_6 
MBt+ ε_(i,t) 
which: 
RMt  : real earning 
management 
α  : constanta 
β_(1-6)  : coefisien 
ACEXPt : Financial and 
accounting expertise of audit committee 
members, as measured by number of 
members who have expertise or experience 
in the field of accounting and finance. 
ACSIZEt : Audit committee 
size, measured by the number of audit 
committee members that exist in every 
company. 
ACTENt : Tenure chairmanof 
the audit committee, as measured by the 
number of tenure of the chairman of the 
audit committee since the first appointment 
until the period of the study 
ACOTHt : The number of 
positions that were held by the chairman of 
the audit committee, measured by the 
number of positions that are concurrently 
chairman of the audit committee, both 
within and outside the company. 
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SIZEt  : The size of the 
company, based on the natural logarithm of 
market value. 
ROAt  : Return on asset 
MBt  : Market-to-book 
ratio 
 
According to Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2008), accounting expertise 
and financial shared by members of the 
audit committee can be interpreted as 
directors who are or who have been 
included in one of the members of the 
following groups: graduates from 
accounting, auditor, certified public 
accountant (CPA), principal or chief 
financial officers (CFO), controller, and 
principal or chief accounting officers 
(CAO). 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 2 shows the results of 
descriptive statistic tests. The results 
showed that the number of samples (N) is 
111. The maximum value for the variable of 
real earnings management (RMt) is1.242, 
while the minimum value is 0.004. The 
average value is 0.346. Standard deviation 
of real earnings management variable is 
0.256 can shows the variation of the value 
of inter-company from year to year. 
For variable accounting and 
financial expertise on audit committee 
members (ACEXPt) minimum value is 1.0 
and a maximum value is 3.0 with an average 
value is  2.261. This suggests that most 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in the year 2012-2014 has been 
implement the requirement of the Capital 
Market Supervisory Agency and Financial 
Institution (BAPEPAM LK), that is at least 
1 member who has accounting and financial 
expertise.The standard deviation is 0.747 
indicates a variation contained in the audit 
committee financial accounting expertise. 
For the variable size of the audit 
committee (ACSIZEt) minimum value is 
3.0 and a maximum value is 4.0 with an 
average value is 3.063. This suggests that 
most manufacturing companies have 
implementation requirements of the Capital 
Market Supervisory Agency and Financial 
Institution (BAPEPAM LK) is a minimum 
have 3 members of audit committee. The 
standard deviation is 0.244 indicates a 
variation contained in the variable size of 
the audit committee. 
For variable tenure chairman of the 
audit committee (ACTENt) minimum value 
is 0.0 and a maximum value is 13.0. The 
average value is 5.243 that are shows the 
majority of the company's audit committee 
chairman on manufacture serves more than 
one period. The standard deviation is 4.110 
indicates a variation contained in this 
variable. 
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For a variable number of positions 
that were be held by the chairman of the 
audit committee (ACOTHt) minimum value 
is 0.0 and a maximum value is 4.0 with an 
average value is 1.532. This indicates that a 
portion the chairman of the audit committee 
have another positions both within the 
company and outside the company. The 
standard deviation is 0.922 indicates the 
variation contained in this variable. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptif Statistic Test Result 
Variabel N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
REM 111 0,004 1,242 0,346 0,256 
ACEXP 111 1,0 3,0 2,261 0,747 
ACSIZE 111 3,0 4,0 3,063 0,244 
ACTEN 111 0,0 13,0 5,243 4,110 
ACOTH 111 0,0 4,0 1,532 0,922 
ROA 111 -0,170 0,350 0,079 0,096 
SIZE 111 4,143 10,165 7,098 1,541 
MB 111 -2,695 52,394 3,688 6,563 
Source : Secondary data were processed, 2016; REM:Real earnings management; ACEXP: 
Financial accounting expertise of audit committee members; ACSIZE:Audit committee size; 
ACTEN: Tenure chairman of the audit committee; ACOTH:The number of positions that 
were held by the chairman of the audit committee; ROA: Return on asset;SIZE:The size of 
the company; MB: Market-to-book ratio 
 
 Table3 shows the results of 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for each 
independent variable to test 
multicollinearity between each independent 
variable. The results shows each 
independent variable has a value of VIF is 
less than 10. Based on these results it can be 
concluded that there is no multicollinearity 
of each independent variable.  
Table 3 also shows the test of 
hypothesis in this research. The following 
are the results of testing hypothesis were 
made: 
Influence of Financial and 
Accounting Expertise of Audit Committee 
Members toward the Real Earnings 
Management  
From the test results have shown the 
value of the variable probability of financial 
accounting expertise of audit committee 
members is smaller than the 0.05 level that 
is equal to 0.019 (0.019 <0.05). This means 
that the variable financial accounting 
expertise of audit committee members 
significantly affect the real earnings 
management. However, the direction 
coefficient indicates a positive direction. 
The results of this test mean that the 
financial accounting expertise of audit 
committee members to make real earnings 
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management increases. Thus hypothesis 1 
which states that “financialand accounting 
expertise of audit committee members 
negatively affect the real earnings 
management" is rejected. 
Based on the Decree of Chairman of 
Bapepam Number: Kep-29 / PM / 2004 
states that have at least one member with 
expertise in accounting and finance. 
Although most of the companies listed in 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange has followed 
the rules has not yet been able to reduce 
their earnings management. The results can 
be seen by the average value for the variable 
financial accounting expertise (ACEXPt) of 
2.261. The value of the average shows that 
most companies have members with 
expertise in accounting and finance more 
than one person. 
The large number of members with 
expertise in the financial and accounting 
rather than reducing earningsmanagement, 
but instead make more practice 
earningsmanagement in the company's. 
This can be due to the audit committee 
members who do not have an educational 
background in accounting or finance 
considered to have the ability in the field of 
accounting and finance when to be a 
member of the audit committee. In addition, 
the appointment of independent directors to 
be the chairman of the audit committee 
independence is questionable. Problems 
independence and expertise in accounting 
and finance may cause the audit committee 
is more likely to side with management 
when there is disagreement between 
management and the external auditor. 
Therefore, earnings management conducted 
by the management because support from 
the audit committee. This condition may 
cause financial accounting expertise of 
audit committee members have positive 
influence on earnings management of real 
(Sanjaya, 2008 in Ariyani 2011). 
 
Influence of Audit Committee Size 
toward Real Earnings Management 
From the test results have shown the 
value of the variable probability of audit 
committee size is smaller than the 
significant level of 0.05, which is equal to 
0.000 (0.000 <0.05). This means that the 
variable audit committee size significantly 
affect the real earnings management. 
However, the direction coefficient of the 
audit committee size showed a positive 
direction. The results of this test mean that 
the audit committee size make real earnings 
management increases. Therefore, 
hypothesis 2 which states that "the audit 
committee size negatively affect the real 
earnings management" is rejected. 
Based on the Decree of Chairman of 
Bapepam Number: Kep-29 / PM / 2004 
stated that the establishment of an audit 
Jurnal Akuntansi & Auditing 
            Volume 13/No. 1 Tahun 2016  :  61-79 
 
 
75 
  
committee must have at least three 
members. Although the average company is 
already implementing these rules, it still has 
not been able to reduce their real earnings 
management activities. The results showed 
that the audit committee size would increase 
the occurrence of earnings management. It 
can be caused due to the small number of 
audit committee members. The number of 
members is too little can cause problems 
due to the lack of division of duties of 
members (Klein, 2012). This leads to make 
supervision toward management when 
financial reporting processes less qualified, 
this condition allows management doing 
fraud. This condition may cause the audit 
committee size is a positive influence on 
real earnings management. 
 
Influence of Tenure Chairmanof the 
Audit Committee toward Real Earnings 
Management 
From the test results have shown the 
value of the variable probability tenure 
chairman of the audit committee is greater 
than the significant level of 0.05, which 
amounted to 0.772 (0.722> 0.05). This 
means that the variable tenure of audit 
committee chairman does not affect the real 
earnings management. Therefore 
hypothesis 3 which states that "the tenure of 
audit committee chairman negatively affect 
the real earnings management" has been 
rejected. 
The long duration appointment 
chairman of the audit committee is 
apparently not affecting the earnings 
management. This can be due to a decline in 
the performance chairman of the audit 
committee. This performance degradation 
can be caused by the chairman of the audit 
committee has to know about the company's 
condition, so that the chairman of the audit 
committee have felt no need to work hard 
again to oversee the management. The 
action taken by the chairman of the audit 
committee could lead to other audit 
committee members to do the same. It can 
create an audit committee is no longer 
effective when oversee management to the 
financial reporting process. This condition 
may lead to tenure chairman of the audit 
committee has no effect on earnings 
management. 
 
Influence of Number of Positions that 
were be held by the Chairman of the 
Audit Committee toward the Real 
Earnings Management 
From the test results have shown a 
probability value of a variable number of 
positions that were held by the chairman of 
the audit committee is smaller than the 
significant level of 0.05, which amounted to 
0.045 (0.045 <0.05). This means that a 
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variable number of positions that were held 
by the chairman of the audit committee 
significantly affect the real earnings 
management. In addition, the direction 
coefficient of the size of the audit committee 
showed a negative direction. The results of 
this test mean that the number of positions 
that were held by the chairman of the audit 
committee makes real earnings 
management is reduced. Therefore 
hypothesis 4 which states that "the number 
of positions that were held by the chairman 
of the audit committee negatively affect the 
real earnings management" are accepted. 
Based on the average value for a variable 
number of positions that were held by the 
chairman of the audit committee (ACOTHt) 
that is equal to 1.532 with a maximum value  
is 4.0 and a minimum value is 0.0 indicates 
that the majority of the chairman of the audit 
committee has more than one position. A 
large number of positions that were held by 
the chairman of the audit committee were 
effective for reducing their earnings 
manipulation carried out by the 
management. A large number of positions 
that were held by the chairman of the audit 
committee are made chairman of the audit 
committee more experienced as it faces a 
different situation for every company where 
he worked. With the experience, of course, 
that isenhancing the knowledge and 
expertise of the chairman of the audit 
committee. Increasing the expertise and 
experience is the basis for the chairman of 
the audit committee to motivate members to 
work better. With so many positions that 
were held by the chairman of the audit 
committee, pointed out that the chairman of 
the audit committee also has a good 
reputation, so of course the chairman of the 
audit committee will give a maximum 
contribution to the company. Therefore, 
oversight toward management will increase 
and reduce manipulation practice by 
management. 
  
Table 4 
Hypothesis Test Result 
Variables B t 
Variance Inflation 
Factor 
(Constant) -0,898 -3,760  
ACEXPt 0,061 2,378** 1,311 
ACSIZEt 0,328 4,212* 1,272 
ACTENt 0,001 0,291 1,183 
ACOTHt -0,040 -2,033** 1,134 
ROAt 1,732 8,136* 1,478 
SIZEt -0,002 -0,154 1,711 
MBt 0,009 3,080* 1,259 
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Source : Secondary data were processed, 2016; *: significant at level 0,01; **: significant 
at level 0,05; Real earnings management: dependent variable; ACEXP: Financial accounting 
expertise of audit committee members; ACSIZE: Audit committee size; ACTEN: Tenure 
chairman of the audit committee; ACOTH: The number of positions that were held by the 
chairman of the audit committee; ROA: Return on asset;SIZE: The size of the company; 
MB: Market-to-book ratio 
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study is to 
examine the influence of the characteristics 
of the audit committee toward real earnings 
management. This is their conclusion based 
on the analysis of data that has been 
described in previous chapters: 
1. The first characteristic ofaudit 
committee, that is financial and accounting 
expertise of audit committee members. The 
results show the financial and accounting 
expertise of audit committee members has 
significant positive effect on real earnings 
management. 
2. The second characteristic of audit 
committee, thatis audit committee size. The 
results showed that the audit committee size 
has significant positive effect on real 
earnings management. 
3. The third characteristics of audit 
committee that isthe audit committee 
tenure. The results showed that the tenure of 
the audit committee has no significant effect 
on real earnings management. 
4. The fourth characteristic of audit 
committee, which is the number of positions 
that were held by the chairman of the audit 
committee. The results showed that the 
number of positions that were be held by the 
chairman of the audit committee has 
significant negative effect on the real 
earnings management. 
 
Research conducted has weakness 
and limitations that reduce the perfection of 
research results. The next research is 
expected to pay attention to the limitations 
of this study. Limitations of this study are: 
1. Many companies do not attach the 
complete information related to the audit 
committee in the annual report, so it cannot 
be sampled. 
2. The sample of companies used as 
a research object only manufacturing 
company, so it has not been able to include 
results for all companies listed on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
3.   The result has not been able to 
provide empirical evidence toward tenure 
the chief of audit committee variable. 
 
Future studies are expected to 
present the results of a higher quality and 
accurate by watching that is some 
suggestion: 
78 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS ON REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT  
Supriyaningsih 
Fuad 
Diponegoro University 
1. Future studies may use different 
sample other than manufacturing 
companies, such as financial 
companies and banks due to the 
financial sector has different 
characteristics with the company on 
manufacture. 
2. The next research can add variables to 
the characteristics of the audit 
committee, such as the frequency of 
audit committee meetings, the 
independence of the audit committee, 
and so on. This is because there are 
many variables that can be used to 
explain the relationship of audit 
committee characteristics and 
earnings management. 
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